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ABSTRACT
On the release of Fukushima-treated wastewater into the
oceans, Japan argues, based on the wastewater not causing
transboundary environmental harm, that neither international
nuclear treaties nor the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea prohibits the release of Fukushima wastewater; thus, Japan has
the right to discharge Fukushima wastewater. This article argues
that the contemporary jurisprudential trend is conspicuous enough
to counter Japan’s firm conviction about the lawfulness of the
discharge of Fukushima wastewater. To this end, this article adduces
how Part XII of UNCLOS has evolved through the interpretation of
various international courts and other legal instruments, thereby
indicating that the planned release at Fukushima may not stand up
to close scrutiny under the UNCLOS regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Concern over sea pollution has come to the fore due to a series
of oil tanker accidents, which have spilled thousands of tons of oil
into the sea from 1967 onward.1 Although oil tanker accidents at
sea are tragic events for the marine environment, land-based
pollutants are responsible for around eighty percent of
contemporary marine degradation. 2 Notwithstanding, no legally
binding international treaty on regulating land-based pollution
sources has come into effect.3 Identifying land-based sources for
marine pollution has proved elusive, rendering a causal link
between the source and the damage suffered extremely difficult.4

1. See R. R. CHURCHILL & A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 328 (3d ed. 1999). Such
accidents include Torrey Canyon off Land’s End in 1967, Amoco Cadiz off Brittany in 1978,
Exxon Valdez in Alaska in 1989, and Sea Empress off southwest Wales in 1996. Id.
2 . U.N. Env’t Programme (UNEP), UNEP 2007 Annual Report 43 (2007),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/7647/UNEP%202007%20Annual%20Report-2008806.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/LL3V-GMKJ].
3. Yukari Takamura, Release of Radioactive Substances into the Sea and International
Law: The Japanese Experience in the Course of Nuclear Disaster, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF DISASTER RELIEF 89, 100 (David D. Caron, et al. eds., 2014).
4. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 389.
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A clean ocean is considered an international public good5 which
states, as consumers, may use whether they pay for it or not. This
presents a “collective action problem,”6 which perverts attitudes
around the issue of land-based marine pollution. Despite the
necessity of collective cooperation for the community as a whole,
each member easily evades expenditure out of selfish intentions.7
The governance of marine environmental protection from landbased sources is “left in the hands of over 125 coastal states with
differing laws and policies,”8 with the exception of some global or
regional soft law instruments.9 This disjointed regulatory system
paradigmatically illustrates the infancy of international
environmental law.10
At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.1 earthquake hit
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant (“Fukushima”), located 200
km northeast of Tokyo. The plant is owned and operated by the
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). 11 A 15-meter tsunami
disabled the power supply and cooling of three Fukushima
reactors, causing all three cores to melt within the first three
days. 12 Beginning on April 4, 2011, TEPCO released more than
10,000 tons of “low-level” radioactive water into the ocean to open
up storage for “high-level” radioactive water. The low-level
radioactive water. The low-level radioactive water, however, was
5. Public goods are goods that cannot be withheld from consumers who do not pay
for them, and whose consumption does not reduce their availability to other consumers.
See JOHN RAVENHILL, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 55, 421 (5th ed. 2017).
6. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICS ECONOMY 69 (1st ed. 2005).
7. In his 1991 article, Bernard H. Oxman depicted this classic dilemma as a “free
rider” problem. This term was also borrowed from economics. See Bernard H. Oxman, The
Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.& POL., 109,
112 (1991).
8. David L. VanderZwaag & Ann Powers, The Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Pollution and Activities: Gauging the Tides of Global and Regional
Governance, 2323 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L,, 423, 424 (2008).
9. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, 380(providing an account of such soft law
instruments).
10 . Régis Chemain, The ‘Polluter Pays’ Principle, in, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 877, 877 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (noting that “the ‘paradoxical
separation’ between damage to the environment and responsibility bears witness to the
infancy of international environmental law”).
11. Adam Dukett, Fukushima in Numbers, THE CHEMICAL ENGINEER, Mar. 2021, at 28.
12. Fukushima Daiichi Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N,: INFORMATION LIBRARY (Apr.
2021), https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safetyof-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx [https://perma.cc/BUU9-7785].
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significantly above the standard of discharge under Japanese law.13
Due to the area’s topography, unlike that of Chernobyl, a significant
amount of radioactive fallout went into the ocean.14
As of April 2021, it is reported that about 1.25 million tons of
wastewater15 are stored in more than 1,000 tanks at the plant site,
continually accumulating at a rate of about 170 tons a day.16 This
wastewater is produced in the cooling process, after which a
filtration process using multi-nuclide removal equipment—the
advanced liquid processing system (“ALPS”)—should follow to
reduce the contamination rate of the wastewater. 17 However,
approximately seventy percent of ALPS-treated water contains
radioactive materials, such as ruthenium, plutonium, strontium,
and cobalt, in concentrations exceeding regulatory standards for
discharge.18
On April 13, 2021, Japan announced that it had decided to
gradually release tons of Fukushima wastewater into the ocean,
claiming that the discharge of Fukushima-treated wastewater is
the best option and that “treated” wastewater is not harmful to
human health. 19 Some scientists argue that treated wastewater
will cause no health concerns, as even seawater contains traces of
uranium. 20 In contrast, others point out that the tritium in the
treated wastewater “organically binds to other molecules, moving
13. Takamura, supra note 3, at 92.
14. Andrew Wang, Nuclear Waste: Forever Contaminated?, BERKELEY SCI. J. 24, 25
(2015)(explaining that “In Chernobyl, the winds carried the fallout across Europe, while
in Fukushima, the fallout mostly went into the ocean because of Japan’s mostly
mountainous topography”).
15 . Commentators use different names for wastewater at the Fukushima power
plant, which include “Fukushima nuclear wastewater,” “radioactive water,” “treated waste
water,” “tritium-tainted water,” “contaminated water,” “Fukushima water,” and
“Fukushima waste water.” This article uses “Fukushima-treated wastewater” in an attempt
to choose neutralized parlance.
16 . Jennifer Jett & Ben Dooley, Fukushima Wastewater Will Be Released Into the
TIMES
(Apr.
12,
2021),
Ocean,
Japan
Says,
N.Y
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/world/asia/japan-fukushima-wastewaterocean.html [https://perma.cc/G26W-KXMP].
17. John Boyd, Japan’s Plan to Discharge Fukushima Radioactive Water into the Sea
has Supporters as Well as Foes, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/policy/japans-plan-to-dischargefukushima-radioactive-water-into-the-sea-has-supporters-as-well-as-foes
[https://perma.cc/84YW-CZ8L].
18. Id.
19. Jett & Dooley, supra note 16.
20. Boyd, supra note 17.
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up the food chain affecting plants and fish and humans.”21 Critics of
the Japanese plan to release Fukushima wastewater argue that
there are alternatives to “the cheapest option, [which is] dumping
the water into the Pacific Ocean,”22 such as “geosphere injection,
vapor release, hydrogen release, underground burial, and longterm storage.” Those critics recommend “adopt[ing] the best
available technology to minimise radiation hazards by storing and
processing the water.”23
This issue’s connection to nuclear-related materials begs the
question of whether the international nuclear-related legal regime
has the authority to limit the discharge of Fukushima-treated
wastewater. The short answer is no. Although the International
Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) has safety standards for
operations making use of nuclear materials, services, equipment,
facilities, and information,24 these IAEA standards usually apply to
a consenting state’s activities. However, Japan has not consented
to IAEA oversight, and is therefore not bound by such IAEA
standards.25 None of the international nuclear treaties that Japan
has joined thus far—including “the Convention on Assistance in
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,” 26 “the
21 . U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Japan: UN Experts Say
Deeply Disappointed by Decision to Discharge Fukushima Water, (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=27000&La
ngID=E [https://perma.cc/3ZMV-LJ6C] (asserting that the hazards of tritium have been
underestimated and could pose risks to humans and the environment for over 100 years).
22. Jett & Dooley, supra note 16.
23. Xiaoou Zheng, Does Fukushima Wastewater Decision Violate Our Environmental
Rights?, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.ejiltalk.org/does-fukushimawastewater-decision-violate-our-environmental-rights/ [https://perma.cc/KX27-4ALT];
Duncan E. J. Currie & Shaun Burnie, Japan’s Plan for Radioactive Water Defies International
TIMES
(Mar.
9,
2021),
Law,
KOREA
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/07/371_285553.html
[https://perma.cc/6SBR-5ZWW] (“The discharge of radioactive materials into the marine
environment from the nuclear plant will inevitably increase marine species’ exposure to
radioactivity, with the exact level of exposure depending on multiple variables. The
concentrations in biota are of direct relevance to those who may consume them, including
marine species, and ultimately, humans.”).
24. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, at art. III.A., (Dec. 28, 1989).
25. Takamura, supra note 3, at 94.
26. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Convention On Assistance In The Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, INFCIRC/336 (Nov. 18, 1986) (Adopted on
September 26, 1986 and entered into force on February 26, 1987. Japan is party to this
convention since 1987.).
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Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,” 27 “the
Convention on Nuclear Safety,”28 and “the 1997 Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management” 29 —specifically prohibit or
regulate the release of radioactive materials into the sea.30
Japan’s main arguments can be outlined as follows: a)
although the possibility that the radioactive material in the
wastewater “may be bio-accumulating in fish and marine
animals,” 31 treated wastewater “neither caused transboundary
adverse effects to the environment nor implied an international
transboundary release of radiological safety significance for
another state”32; b) neither international nuclear treaties nor the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) 33
makes the release of Fukushima wastewater illegal; and c) as a
corollary, Japan has the right to discharge Fukushima-treated
wastewater into the sea under the current international legal
system.34
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that although the
texts of relevant provisions (mostly Part XII) of UNCLOS appear to
be vague and thus unlikely to regulate a particular state’s land27. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Convention On Early Notification Of A Nuclear
Accident, INFCIRC/335 (Nov. 18, 1986) (Adopted on September 26, 1986 and entered into
force on October 27, 1986. Japan is a member state since 1987.).
28. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Convention On Nuclear Safety, INFCIRC/449
(July 5, 1994) (Adopted on June 17, 1994 and entered into force on October 24, 1996. Japan
is party to this convention since 1996.).
29. Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Joint Convention On The Safety Of Spent Fuel
Management And On The Safety Of Radioactive Waste Management,, INFCIRC/546 (Dec. 24,
1997)(Adopted on September 5, 1997 and it came into effect on June 18, 2001.Japan
deposited its instrument of accession on August 25, 2003 and it entered into force on
November 24, 2003.).
30. Takamura, supra note 3, at 96. Moreover, Japan is not a state party to liability for
nuclear damage treaties, such as “the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage and its “1996 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage” and “the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability and its 2004
Protocol," as well as the "1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention on Nuclear Third Party
Liability" and its 2004 Protocol, which was adopted by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Id.
31. Takamura, supra note 3, at 90.
32. Id. at 107.
33. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S.
3,
397,
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
34. Takamura, supra note 3, at 100.
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based behavior that results in systemic marine degradation, the
contemporary jurisprudential trend is conspicuous enough
effectively counter Japan’s firm conviction that the discharge of
Fukushima wastewater was lawful. This long-envisaged
interpretative trend of Part XII of UNCLOS, which leans toward
compelling states to protect the marine environment is the
“marine environmental turn” in the law of the sea. The rest of this
Article is concerned with adducing how this marine environmental
turn has been made through international courts and other legal
instruments.
Section II outlines customary rules with regard to
environmental protection and, specifically, the marine
environmental protection regime of UNCLOS. Section III examines
the marine environmental turn in the law of the sea, which resulted
from international courts’ evolving interpretation of UNCLOS to
require an advanced level of due diligence from member states.
This reading of UNCLOS stems from its procedural obligation that
states review all internal activities that possibly impact the marine
environment. Section III also emphasizes the importance of
conducting environmental impact assessments and consulting
states that are likely to be affected by planned activities. Japan’s
position on the Fukushima-treated wastewater discharge will not
likely withstand this new scrutiny. Part IV reviews judicial and
regional implications of the marine environmental turn in UNCLOS
for the discharge of Fukushima wastewater, focusing on regional
fisheries agreements, the compromissory clause of UNCLOS, and
the role of experts in judicial proceedings.
II. THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
International law concerning the marine environment is
composed of Part XII of UNCLOS, customary international law, and
regional environmental treaties, as Article 237 of UNCLOS
envisages.35 Various customary international law obligations that

35. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 237(1):
The provisions of this Part [Obligations under Other Conventions on the
Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment] are without prejudice
to the specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions and
agreements concluded previously which relate to the protection and
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relate to the environment have emerged gradually over time. Some
customary rules are represented in international agreements such
as UNCLOS. Furthermore, international jurisprudence has
elaborated some aspects of international law concerning marine
protection, including Part XII of UNCLOS.36
A. From Customary International Marine Environmental Rules to
UNCLOS
In 1941, the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal opined a historic
proposition that
under the principles of international law . . . no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.37

In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) noted that it is illegal if states knowingly use their territories
to the detriment of other states’ rights.38 In the 1957 Lake Lanoux
Arbitration (Affaire du Lac Lanoux),39 the tribunal confirmed two
state obligations: 1) to not cause substantial or serious damage to
the environment of other states, and 2) to notify and consult with
other parties that may be affected prior to engaging in activities
which may harm a shared resource. 40 Therefore, a “no harm
principle”—which prohibits states from discharging harmful
matter into the sea if it would likely end up in another state—has
existed in customary international law since 1957. The principle,
however, is vague regarding concrete elements.41
In 1958, states discussed and adopted a particular provision
on the dumping of radioactive waste in Article 25 of the

preservation of the marine environment and to agreements which may be
concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention.
36. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 106, 107-08 (3d ed.
2009).
37. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), III R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Mar. 11, 1941).
38. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 (Apr. 9).
39. Lac Lanoux (Lake Lanoux) Arb. (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 317 (1957).
40. Astrid Epiney, Lac Lanoux Arb., in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT’L L.
628, 628 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
41. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 322.
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“Convention on the High Seas,” 42 which read: “Every State shall
take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping
of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and
regulations which may be formulated by the competent
international organizations.” 43 In its commentary, the
International Law Commission (“ILC”) noted that, “A new source of
pollution of the sea is the dumping of radioactive waste . . . such
dumping, which may be particularly dangerous for fish and fish
eaters, should be put on the same footing as pollution by oil.”44
Beginning in the 1970s, developments in international
environmental law began to supersede the concept of sovereignty.
The 1972 London Convention45 explicitly prohibits the dumping of
radioactive waste into the oceans. Around this time, environmental
principles made inroads into many soft law instruments. Principle
21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration contains the general
principles emanating from Trail Smelter and subsequent
jurisprudence.46 In the 1996 advisory opinion, ICJ reaffirmed that
the prevention of transboundary harm arising from hazardous
activities has become a central obligation of international law as
customary law:
The environment is not an abstraction but represents the
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human
beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the
general obligation of States to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the
corpus of international law relating to the environment.47

42. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S 11(entered into force on
September 30, 1962). Japan ratified this convention on June 10, 1968.
43. Id. at art. 25(1).
44. Report of the Int’l L. Comm’n to The General Assembly, 1956 Y.B ON THE INT’L L.
COMM’N 253, 286, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/104.
45. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes & Other
Matter, Nov. 13, 1972, 11 ILM, 1291 (and it entered into force on August 30, 1975)
[hereinafter The London Convention]. Japan became a member state in 1980.
46. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment., Stockholm Declaration, (June 16,
1972)
https://www.ipcc.ch/apps/njlite/srex/njlite_download.php?id=6471
[https://perma.cc/WNG9-SZVU].
47. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, 241–42. Later in 2015, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
("ITLOS") ascertained this part of ICJ Advisory Opinion and the customary legal status of
the rule in its decision on provisional measure of Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
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In 1982, for the first time in history, the obligation to protect
and preserve the marine environment became part of a
multilateral treaty with binding force. 48 Part XII of UNCLOS—
which has 46 provisions dedicated to the protection and
preservation of the marine environment—is praised as the
“paradigm for all international environmental law,” 49 since it is
“universal” and “applicable to all States as generally accepted
customary international law.”50 It is true that UNCLOS innovatively
codified “erga omnes interests”—specifically determined interests
that states have towards the international community as a whole—
by way of Part XII. Yet, it should be stressed that UNCLOS is a
“product of its time”—negotiated during the 1970s, the agreement
targeted the uses of the oceans and was not an “environmental
treaty in essence.”51
Article 192 of UNCLOS sets out that, “States have the
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.” In
principle, the discharge of Fukushima-treated wastewater falls
within the terms of Article 192 and the subsequent provisions of
Part XII since “pollution of the marine environment” is defined as
the introduction of “substances or energy into the marine
environment … which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
hazards to human health, [or a] hindrance to marine activities.”52
Article 192 provides the most general legal obligation, but not a
political one, in Part XII, 53 reflecting the pre-existing customary
in the Atlantic Ocean between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire on April 25, 2015. See. Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, Provisional Measures,
2015 ITLOS Rep., 33, ¶ 71.
48. Victor Alencar Mayer Feitosa Ventura, Environmental Jurisdiction in the Law of
the Sea: The Brazilian Blue Amazon 196-97. (2020); Moira L. McConnell & Edgar Gold, The
Modem Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment? 23 CASE WESTERN RSRV. J. OF INT’L L. 83, 89 (1991).
49. McConnell & Gold, supra note 48, at. 103.
50. Louis Sohn, Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention Regarding the Protection
and Preservation of the Marine Environment, in THE DEVELOPING ORDER OF THE OCEANS 106
(Robert B. Krueger & Stefan A. Riesenfeld, eds., 1985).
51. VENTURA, supra note 48.
52. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 1(1)(4).
53 . Chie Kojima, South China Sea Arbitration and the Protection of the Marine
Environment: Evolution of UNCLOS Part XII Through Interpretation and the Duty to
Cooperate, 21 ASIAN YEARBOOK INT’L L. 166, 171 (2015). UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III 1280 (Alexander Proelss et al. eds., 2017).
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international law no-harm-principle, sourced in various
international judicial determinations.54
Article 194(1) sets forth that, “States shall take all measures
necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source, using for this purpose the best
practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their
capabilities.” Article 194(1) is a procedural rule55 as supported by
the 2015 Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitration. The Tribunal
stated that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to
“endeavor to harmonize” its policies with Mauritius. 56 Article
194(2), which aims to protect other states from marine pollution
damage, 57 contains a stronger obligation than the one usually
found in international customary law.58 Note that the second half
of Article 194(2) does not require “the existence of damage” as a
requirement of establishing liability. Thus, it is logical to infer that
the “existence of wide-spread pollution” arising from incidents or
activities under a state’s jurisdiction or control that spreads
beyond the area where the state exercises sovereign rights is
enough to establish liability for failing to “take all measures.” 59
Because under Article 194(3), such measures taken by States “shall
deal with all sources of pollution,” neither the place of origin nor
the source gives a state an excuse for failing to prevent, reduce, and

(explaining that "If this provision were only meant to be a political statement, the
negotiating parties would rather have left it solely at another position e.g. at the Preable").
54. Maria Gavouneli, Protection Standards for the Marine Environment: Updating Part
XII of the Law of the Sea Convention?, in STRESS TESTING THE LAW OF THE SEA 254, 256
(Stephen Minas & H. Jordan Diamond eds., 2018).
55. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra
note 53, at 1305.
56. In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protection Area Arb. (Mauritius v. U.K.),
Award 211, ¶¶ 538-39 (Perm Ct. Arb. 2015)[hereinafter Chagos MPA].
57. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 194(2):
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution
to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from
incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread
beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with
this Convention.
58. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 101
[hereinafter Pulp Mills].
59. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra
note 53, at 1306.
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control marine pollution, “whether [it be from] land, marine, or any
other sources.”
It is axiomatic to read Articles 192 and 194 as covering
Fukushima wastewater resulting in marine pollution. Two other
UNCLOS provisions are relevant here: Article 207, which requires
member states to regulate and prevent land-based sources of
marine pollution,60 and Article 123,61 which calls for cooperation
among states bordering an enclosed or semi-closed sea in the
exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under
this Convention. 62 Coastal states, such as China and Korea, may
invoke this provision on the assumption that wastewater has an
adverse impact on the marine environment in the East China Sea,
the Yellow Sea (West Sea), or the East Sea (Sea of Japan).63 Taken
60. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 207 (Pollution from land-based sources):
States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control
pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources . . . taking
into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures. 2. States shall take other measures as may be
necessary to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. 3. States shall
endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate
regional level. 4. States . . . shall endeavour to establish global and regional
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based
sources . . . Such rules . . . shall be re-examined from time to time as
necessary. 5. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and
recommended practices and procedures . . . shall include those designed to
minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the release of toxic, harmful or
noxious substances, especially those which are persistent, into the marine
environment.
61. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 123 (Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or
semi-enclosed seas):
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with
each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their
duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or
through an appropriate regional organization: (a) to coordinate the
management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living
resources of the sea; (b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights
and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine
environment; (c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and
undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the
area; (d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international
organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of
this article.
62. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra
note 53, at 887.
63. China claims that Japan has neither properly consulted with China and Korea, nor
addressed the parties’ legitimate. See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
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together, Articles 192, 194, 207, and 123 appear to cover the
Fukushima-treated wastewater comprehensively.
Article 197 requires states to cooperate on a global or regional
basis, “directly or through competent international organizations.”
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) regards
the Article 197 duty to cooperate as “a fundamental principle in the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII
of the Convention and general international law.” 64 Additionally,
Article 207 confirms rules for land-based sources. Article 207(4)
obliges states to “endeavor to establish global and regional rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent,
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from landbased sources.” But it is little surprise that states pay scant
attention to elaborating strict international rules and regulations
for land-based pollution sources compared to other sources of
marine pollution since economic developments associated with
land-based pollution count for much with states.65
Further, environmental impact assessments (“EIA”) are not
mentioned in UNCLOS. However, Section 4 of Part XII, comprising
Articles 204 to 206, sets out a state obligation to conduct
environmental assessments for activities that might result in
marine pollution or significant changes to the marine
environment.66 Yet, subjective elements in Article 206— phrases
such as, “reasonable grounds for believing” and “as far as
People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press
Conference
on
June
11,
2021
(June
11,
2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1883214.shtml
[https://perma.cc/LB5G-GDRC]; see also China Supports S. Korea's Just Position in
Condemning Japan's Decision to Dump Wastewater into Sea, Urges Japan to Withdraw
TIMES
(June
30,
Mistaken
Plan:
FM,
GLOBAL
2021)https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202106/1227512.shtml
[https://perma.cc/H3SP-R7D8].
64. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.) Provisional Measures, 2001 ITLOS Rep., ¶ 82 (Nov. 9,
2001).
65. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra
note 53, at 1380.
66. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 206 (Assessment of potential effects of activities):
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities
under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or
significant and harmful changes to the marine environment, they shall, as
far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such activities on the
marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results of such
assessments in the manner provided in article 205.
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practicable,” as well as the words “substantial” and “significant”—
have aided and abetted states’ excuses for not conducting EIAs.67
The discharge of Fukushima-treated wastewater does not fall
under the category of “dumping” in accordance with Article
1(1)(5) of UNCLOS because the Fukushima is not a “man-made
structure at sea.”68 Therefore, provisions regulating “dumping” in
UNCLOS have no bearing on Fukushima wastewater. Neither the
1972 London Convention69—which prohibits the dumping of highlevel radioactive waters into the sea—nor the 1996 Protocol to the
1972 London Convention70—which prohibits the dumping of all
radioactive waste and other materials into the sea through a
“reverse list approach”—can regulate wastewater for the same
reason.71
In sum, Fukushima wastewater squarely fits into Part XII of
UNCLOS and customary international laws that are designed to
protect the marine environment. However, the discretion that
these legal instruments lend to states in drafting regulations and
enforcing standards prevents relevant rules from having any
practical effect 72 Echoing this understanding, Yukari Takamura
67. See NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 116 (2008).
68. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 1(1)(5)(a): “dumping” means: (i) any deliberate
disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea; (ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea.
69. The London Convention, supra note 45, at art. 4.1. Under this convention, parties
adopted a nonbinding resolution calling for a moratorium on dumping of low-level
radioactive waste pending completion of a two-year technical and scientific review of such
dumping by experts. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], London Convention Res. LDC.14(7),
Disposal of Radio-Active Wastes and Other Radio-Active Matter at Sea (1983).
70. Protocol to the 1972 London Convention, Nov. 7, 1996, ATS 11 (came into effect
on Mar 24, 2006) [hereinafter 1996 Protocol]. Japan became party to the Protocol in 2007.
71. Article 1.4 of the 1996 Protocol defines “dumping” as follows:
Any deliberate disposal into the sea of wastes or other matter from vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 2. Any deliberate
disposal into the sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea; 3. Any storage of wastes or other matter in the seabed and
the subsoil thereof from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea; and 4. Any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms
or other man-made structures at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate
disposal. Id. at art. 1.4.
As a result, Yukari Takamura asserts that “the release from Fukushima Daiichi NPP
falls outside of the scope of the 1996 Protocol.” See Takamura, supra note 3, at 96.
72. Despite the assertive declarations in UNCLOS of mandatory obligations on states
to protect the marine environment, their effect in practice is muted. Damaged states have
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summarizes that “states enjoy some degree of discretion in how
and to what extent they implement these obligations…The choice
of measures and the standards is largely left to the discretion of
states since there are few internationally agreed-upon rules and
standards governing land-based pollution.”73
B. The Need for Interpreting Part XII UNCLOS as a “Living”
Framework Instrument
UNCLOS is an “open framework agreement” as a “living
treaty.”74 The law of the sea must be amenable to developments. As
a living treaty, UNCLOS is designed to be responsive to
contemporaneous cries from the seas. It therefore stands to reason
that duties and obligations under UNCLOS ought to be read in a
sustainable fashion.75
Notably, Part XII of UNCLOS has many “open-ended
provisions ripe for further evolution and implementation” in the
interest of the modern conservation norms and objectives of
international marine environmental law.76 In other words, Part XII
cannot be understood as reflecting complete and detailed rules for
states with respect to marine environmental protection. Rather,
bearing in mind that UNCLOS is a framework convention, Part XII
provides a framework that envisages elaboration by subsequent
regional or issue-specific treaties and state practice.77 There is no
difficulties in bringing marine environmental disputes to international proceedings
because of the lack of detail in UNCLOS as to what are the standards of the various elements.
See Alan Boyle, The Environmental Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, 22 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L., 369, 377-78 (2007).
73. Takamura, supra note 3, at 100.
74 . Alan Boyle, Further Development of the 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea:
Mechanisms for Change, in LAW OF THE SEA PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 40, 46 (David Freestone
et al. eds., 2006); VENTURA, supra note 48, at 214.
75. See Richard Barnes, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Integrated Regulation
of the Oceans, in THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AT 30: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND
NEW AGENDAS 190 (David Freestone ed., 2013); VENTURA, supra note 48, at 214.
76 . Robin M. Warner, Conserving Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction: Co-Evolution and Interaction with the Law of the Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 752, 775 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). In this respect, some
argue that states are supposed to become and adhere to other treaties to fulfil their
obligation to protect the marine environment, notwithstanding no express mentions in
Part XII. See David Dzidzornu, Coastal State Obligations and Powers Respecting EEZ
Environmental Protection under Part XII of the UNCLOS: A Descriptive Analysis, 8 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y (1997).
77. Kojima, supra note 53, at 178.
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doubt that provisions regarding protection and preservation of the
marine environment require “living interpretation in the light of
the developments in international law.” 78 The 2016 South China
Sea arbitration demonstrated the living treaty characteristic of
UNCLOS by emphasizing that the content of Article 192 was
informed by other provisions of Part XII and “other applicable
rules of international law,”79 which is interpreted as encompassing
both treaties and customary international law.80
Over about forty years since the adoption of UNCLOS, a
number of such treaties, customary rules, and soft-law
instruments 81 have appeared, providing reference to the
interpretation of Part XII. The paramount examples are the
“Convention on Biological Diversity,” 82 the “1972 London
Convention,” and the “1996 Protocol to the 1972 London
Convention”—which is a “victory for general community interests
over the interests of twenty or so industrialized States.” 83
Regarding non-binding instruments, the “Montreal Guidelines for
the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from
Land-based Sources”—adopted in 1985 by the United Nations
Environment Programme (“UNEP”)—is a noteworthy example.84
Soft law instruments include the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development,85 Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Conference,86 and
the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine

78. Id. at 180.
79. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013–19, Award (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2016) 373, ¶ 941 [hereinafter South China Sea].
80. Kojima, supra note 53, at. 171.
81. The legal status of soft law varies; however, it is not necessarily non-binding in
all circumstances. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 36, at 107.
82. The Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 UNTS 69.
83. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 370. This is particularly so given that dumping
“allows a small number of industrialized states acting for their own benefit to impose
pollution risks on many others, perhaps extending into future generations. See BIRNIE ET
AL., supra note 36, at 467.
84. Governing Council of UNEP, Decision 13/18/II (May 24, 1985).
85. See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CONF.151/26
(Vol.
I)
(June
1992),
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/do
cs/globalcompact/A_CONF.151_26_Vol.I_Declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XZH-XBDZ].
86. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.l 1 (June 1992), U.N. Sales No. E.93.1.8, p. 9ff,
https://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/Agenda%2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JKN5TT8E].
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Environment from Land-based Activities. 87 Although, at first
glance, the aforementioned sources of law present issues of
fragmentation, plurality, and sometimes a lack of binding force, the
mainstreaming of environmental concerns through this
multifaceted legal system has nonetheless benefitted the cause of
protecting the marine ecosystems, and consequentially
contributed to the goal of Part XII of UNCLOS.88
UNCLOS is also a paradigmatic example of “evolutionary
interpretation” of treaties, a method of interpretation as
envisioned in Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.89 ICJ notes that in some situations "the Parties'
intent upon conclusion of the treaty was…to give the terms used…a
meaning or content capable of evolving…so as to make allowance
for…developments in International law." 90 In this respect, the
importance lies in the fact that the interpretation and application
of Part XII of UNCLOS, as the starting point, must be attended to
within the larger legal system at the time of the interpretation out
of regard for the further evolution of the law of the sea.91 On this
very point, in Namibia Advisory Opinion, ICJ opined:
[T]he Court must take into consideration the changes which
have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its
interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent
development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations
and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of
the interpretation.92

Pursuant to Article 293, international courts or tribunals that
interpret Part XII can apply “other rules of international law not
incompatible with UNCLOS,” which prohibits international courts
87. Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt a Global Programme of Action for the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities, Global Programme of
Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities,
UNEP(OCA)/LBA/IG.2/7 (Dec. 5, 1995).
88. See VENTURA, supra note 48, at 195.
89. Id. at 216.
90. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Judgment of 13 July 2009, ICJ Reports 2009, para. 64.
91. Alan Boyle, Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change, in THE 1982 LAW OF THE
SEA CONVENTION AT 30: SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES AND NEW AGENDAS 157 (David Freestone ed.,
2013).
92. Namibia Advisory Opinion (1971) I.C.J. Rep. 16, at 31 (June 21, 1971).
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from functioning in isolation. 93 The South China Sea tribunal
established that generic terms included in UNCLOS can similarly
have an active interaction not only with other environmental
treaties, but also general international law. UNCLOS can therefore
“adapt to new challenges without creating an implementation
agreement or amending to UNCLOS.” 94 Chie Kojima opines that
“the tribunal’s positive attitude towards the principle of systematic
integration in interpreting UNCLOS” is witnessed in the tribunal’s
reading of Article 237 95 as having a close link with the general
obligations of Part XII of UNCLOS, as well as particular obligations
under other treaties.96 In short, no one can be sure that any matter
involving wastewater that threatens marine life will not be dealt
with in connection with other rules—such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity.
Part XII of UNCLOS should be interpreted and applied not only
in the way contained in its original text, but also rather in reference
to rules in relevant international instruments (mainly hard law but
in supplementary terms soft law as well). Only an interpretation of
UNCLOS Part XII that is in context with other rules and obligations
outlined in international cases and ILC instruments can warrant
the legality of states’ behaviors. Such an approach to UNCLOS will
contribute to organic developments of the international law of the
sea system per marine environmental protection. 97 The next
93 . Philippe Gautier, The Role of International Courts and Tribunals in the
Development of Environmental Law, 109 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 192 (2015).
94. Kojima, supra note 53, at 166, 175.
95. UNCLOS, supra note 33, at art. 237 (Obligations under other conventions on the
protection and preservation of the marine environment):
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific
obligations assumed by States under special conventions and agreements
concluded previously which relate to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention. 2. Specific
obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect to
the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be
carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles and
objectives of this Convention.
96 . Kojima, supra note 53, at 172. Also, the tribunal held that a The Tribunal
emphasized that a State could violate Articles 192 and 237 not only by harming the marine
environment but also by failing to take active measures to protect and preserve the marine
environment. See South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 373-74.
97. If states adopt law-making treaties or confirm declarations of legal principles
adopted by international organizations regarding marine environmental protection,
thoseinstrument will be regarded in part as lex lata or statements of what international
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Section will cover how the meaning and scope of various
provisions of Part XII has evolved under judicially review.
III. HOW THE MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL TURN OCCURRED IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA
The marine environmental turn in the law of the sea is the
result of, above all, two trends: 1) international courts and
tribunals increasingly ruling that certain elements constitute the
state obligations under Part XII of UNCLOS, and 2) the growth of
the international community’s common interest in protecting and
preserving the marine environment, especially of areas beyond
national jurisdiction. This section examines three obligations—the
obligation of due diligence, the obligation to conduct
environmental impact assessment, and the obligation to
cooperate—in regards to the lawfulness of Japan’s discharge of
Fukushima wastewater. This Section also examines how the
obligations under Part XII are inherently related to the “erga
omnes” characteristic, and anticipates that international courts will
endorse the status of obligations erga omnes of some core elements
in Part XII of UNCLOS in the future.
A. Rules vs. Standards Under Part XII of UNCLOS
Law and economics scholars distinguish between two
different types of norms in regulatory systems: rules and
standards.98 Rules are clear and easy to apply, thus reducing the
costs and creating greater predictability. Rules, however, produce
higher error rates because future decisionmakers have less leeway
to consider “totality of the circumstances.”99 In contrast, standards
are relatively unclear and hard to apply. Standards render high
decision costs, but ultimate lower error costs since decisionmakers
have some latitude in applying the norm to all the facts.100 In short,
law is and at the same time as lex ferenda or statements of what international should be,
thereby eventually engendering norm development of the matter under consideration. See
Oxman, supra note 7, at 120.
98. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J.
65 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. J. 557
(1992).
99 . JOHN YOO, POINT OF ATTACK: PREVENTIVE WAR, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
WARFARE 93-94 (2014).
100. Id.
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“[t]he more complicated the legal rule, the greater the likelihood
that these administrative costs, including error costs, will be
high.”101
UNCLOS adopts the rule approach for some institutions102 and
the standard approach for others.103 It is reasonable to infer that
the negotiators at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea from
1973 to 1982 (UNCLOS III) might have tried to regulate as much as
they could while still reaching a consensus among ego-centric
sovereign states. Notwithstanding significantly procrastinated
sessions and the accompanying costs of negotiating states, states
had no option but to agree upon a vague resolution in order to
reach a consensus.104 This is how some core provisions of UNCLOS
ended up in the form of standards. Additionally, the negotiators
had simply not foreseen some developments, such as climate
change, marine degradation by massive land-based sources, and
technological developments.105
For some UNCLOS institutions couched in the standard
approach, contemporary decisionmakers—foreign ministries,
international courts, and international lawyers—are perceived to
be more qualified to come up with subsequent measures to
101. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 31 (1995).
102. See e.g., UNCLOS supra note 33, at art. 15 (delimitation of the territorial sea: the
median line out of regard for special circumstances), art. 19 (meaning of innocent
passage), art. 47 (archipelagic baselines: the specific water-to-land ratio requirement and
the maximum length of baselines up to 100 nm), and Part XI (The Area) and Annex III
(Basic Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation) relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS.
103 . See e.g., UNCLOS supra note 33, at Part V (EEZ) (permissibility of certain
activities and methods of maritime boundary delimitation), Part XII (protection and
preservation of the marine environment), Part VIII (Regime of Islands), and Part XIII
(marine scientific research).
104. Approaching the end of UNCLOS III, delegates tired of negotiating and receiving
criticism for the excessive length of the negotiations and associated costs. “The working
premise at the end for largely exhausted delegates at the Third Conference was that
imperfect solutions were better than no solutions at all.” See Myron H. Nordquist & William
G. Phalen, Interpretation of UNCLOS Article 121 and Itu Aba (Taiping) in the South China Sea
Arbitration Award, in INTERNATIONAL MARINE ECONOMY: LAW AND POLICY 27, 77 (Myron H.
Nordquist et al. eds., 2017).
105. For example, UNCLOS negotiators did not expect technological development in
marine scientific research and military intelligence gathering activities. See M.J. Valencia,
Introduction: Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones:
Consensus and Disagreement II, 29 Marine Policy, 97, 98 (2005); Sam Bateman,
Hydrographic Surveying in Exclusive Economic Zones–Is it Marine Scientific Research?, in
FREEDOM OF SEASM PASSAGE RIGHTS, AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 122 (Myron H.
Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).
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improve a regulatory function of UNCLOS. This is because current
governments, international courts and tribunals, and international
lawyers have access to superior information, which was
unavailable to the negotiators, and are equipped with more data,
experience, and better technical qualifications. 106 Understanding
the both the achievements and limitations of UNCLOS III, states
today ought to supplement, reinforce, and implement the marine
environmental protection regimes that draw on “standards.” To
this end, bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements that have
been agreed thus far, the work of ILC, and the materialized
elements of Part XII “standards” through international
jurisprudence should be referred to for the benefit of state parties
to UNCLOS and, by extension, the international community.
B. The Evolving Interpretation of Part XII of UNCLOS
In 1941, the Trail Smelter arbitration first established the “no
harm principle,” and the 1949 Corfu Channel Case further
developed its doctrine. The “no harm principle” limits state
sovereignty in relation to marine environmental damage caused
outside its territory.107 The consensus among most international
legal scholars is that the “no harm principle,” with regards to state
responsibility for pollution damage outside its territory, must be
regarded as customary law because of the 1974 Nuclear Test
case. 108 The 1996 Advisory Opinion of ICJ on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons states, “The existence of the
general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or
areas beyond national jurisdiction is now part of the corpus of
international law relating to the environment.”109 In 2001, the ILC
adopted “Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities” (“the ILC’s 2001 draft articles”). Article
3 of this instrument states that, “The State of origin shall take all
appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm
106. See YOO, supra note 99, at 94-96.
107. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 322 (noting that under the no harm principle
“States must not permit their nationals to discharge into the sea matter that could cause
harm to the nationals of other States”).
108. Nuclear Test (Austl. v. Fr.), Merits, Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 389 (June 1974).
109. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.,
¶ 29 (July 8).
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or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.”110 ILC clarifies that
the meaning of “take all appropriate measure” is an obligation to
“prevent harm, or to minimize the risk thereof,” but that it “cannot
be confined to activities which are already properly appreciated as
involving such a risk. The obligation extends to taking appropriate
measures to identify activities which involve such a risk, and this
obligation is of a continuing character.”111
Under Articles 192 and 194, all states have the “obligation to
ensure” that no damage is caused to other states and that there is
no pollution of the marine environment. This is understood as an
“obligation of conduct” by international courts and tribunals, as
seen, both implicitly and explicitly, in the 2010 Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay, 112 the 2011 Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory
Opinion 113 by the ICJ, and the 2015 Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission (SRFC) Advisory Opinion by ITLOS.114
Under Roman law and civil law traditions, "obligations of
conduct" requires the achievement of a particular procedure
demanding an endeavor toward a goal and an outcome, whereas
"obligation of result" requires a specific and concrete outcome.115
States cannot invariably prevent any use of their territory in ways
harmful to others; yet, states can "reasonably be expected to take

110. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session,
[2001] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 153, UN Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter ILC 2001 Draft
Articles].
111. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
112. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 14.
113. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 41 (noting that “this obligation may be characterized
as an obligation ‘of conduct’ and not ‘of result,’ and as an obligation of ‘due diligence’” and
the notions of obligations “of due diligence” and obligations “of conduct” are connected”).
114 . Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2015 ITLOS Rep., 4 (noting that “obligation of conduct”
requires “due diligence” in the sense of a flag State not only adopting appropriated rules
and measures, but also a “certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise
of administrative control.”).
115. Benoit Mayer, “Obligations of conduct in the international law on climate change:
A defence,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 27
(2018), pp. 130-1; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct:
Some Thoughts About the Implementation of International Obligations, in Mahnoush H.
Arsanjani et al. (eds.), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in Honor of W.
Michael Reisman (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), p. 367
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'appropriate steps.'" 116 According to ICJ, states may infringe an
obligation of conduct without breaching the objective of an
obligation117 Although assessing non-compliance with obligations
of conduct is a difficult task, the burden of proof belongs to the
alleged violator, and international courts would be eventually
requested to assess the evidence of compliance provided by the
parties.118
In 2016, drawing on the relevant decisions, South China Sea
clarifies that the obligation to ensure, as an obligation of conduct,
requires “due diligence” and a “certain level of vigilance” in the
exercise of state functions.119 In the meantime, in the 2015 Chagos
Marine Protected Area arbitration, the tribunal opined that Article
194(1) has a “prospective character,” and thus states’ obligation to
take all measure to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from any
source should be satisfied by the best efforts of states.120
One commentator appraises the importance of the South
China Sea arbitration by claiming that the tribunal touched upon
“common interests of the international community as a whole” for
the manifestation of marine environmental protection.121 In fact,
the South China Sea tribunal confirmed that “the environmental
obligations in Part XII apply to States irrespective of where the
alleged harmful activities took place” 122 and further noted, with
regard to Article 192, that:
Article 192 thus entails the positive obligation to take active
measures to protect and preserve the marine environment . . .
[and] the negative obligation not to degrade the marine
116. Benoit Mayer, “Obligations of conduct in the international law on climate change:
A defence,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 27
(2018), p. 136.
117. Benoit Mayer, “Obligations of conduct in the international law on climate change:
A defence,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 27
(2018), p. 138.
118. Benoit Mayer, “Obligations of conduct in the international law on climate change:
A defence,” Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 27
(2018), p. 139.
119. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 375.
120. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 211.
121. Yoshifumi Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental Obligations
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 27 REV. EUR, COMPAR. & INT’L ENV’T L. 90, 90-91 (2018).
In South China Sea, the Philippines alleged that China had breached Articles 123, 192, 194,
197, 205 and 206 of the Convention (para. 906) and the tribunal found that China breached
Articles 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123 and 206 of UNCLOS (para 1203(12) and (13)).
122. See South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 108, 370.
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environment at the same time. The corpus of international law
relating to the environment, which informs the content of the
general obligation in Article 192, requires that States “ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control.” Thus States have a positive “‘duty to prevent, or at
least mitigate’ significant harm to the environment when
pursuing large-scale construction activities.” The Tribunal
considers this duty informs the scope of the general obligation
in Article 192.123

Furthermore, the tribunal found that Article 192 must be read
against the background of other applicable international law 124
and that the general corpus of international law is to be interpreted
to mean the corpus of international law relating to the
environment, including multilateral environmental treaties. 125
Consequently, the tribunal interpreted Article 192 with reference
to 194(5) and the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), concluding
that some Chinese activities have a “harmful impact on the fragile
marine environment.”126
Bearing in mind the evolving interpretation of Part XII as
demonstrated above, it is reasonable to infer that: a) Articles 192,
194, 207, 127 and 237, along with bilateral or multilateral
agreements regarding the marine environment and marine
resources, concern Fukushima-treated wastewater; b) Japan has
an obligation to “take all measures” to protect the marine
environment from the release of the wastewater; c) Japan has the
obligation, under Articles 192 and 194, that is a mixture of both the
obligation of conduct and result; and d) Japan has a “positive duty
to prevent or mitigate significant harm” to the environment before,
during, and after discharging the water out of regard for the

123. See id. at 380 (internal footnotes omitted).
124. Id. at 381.
125. Id. at 380. See also Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental
Obligations Under the Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 121, at 92.
126. South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 382 (deciding that “a failure to take measures
to prevent these practices would constitute a breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of the
Convention, and turns now to consider China’s responsibility for such breaches”).
127. Article 207 envisages an approach of regional cooperation concerning landbased marine pollution. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A
COMMENTARY, PART III, supra note 53, at 1386.
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“prospective character” 128 of this obligation, regardless of how
slowly the contamination occurs.
C. Due Diligence, Due Regard, and the Precautionary Principle
The duty to prevent harm in customary international law
requires the exercise of due diligence by states to prevent
significant environmental harm from activities within its
jurisdiction or control.129 If a state’s negligence or other failures to
act with due diligence causes harm to other states, liability will
ensue; if such negligence or failure concerns “ultra-hazardous
activities,” strict liability will transpire.130 If harm does occur, the
harm that was brought about by a lack of proper care will demand
the state to pay compensation; yet, for most cases, due diligence
does not purport to mean “strict liability.” In reality, the concept of
the “due diligence” obligation is a variable one, if not everchanging. According to ITLOS, the concept of due diligence
may change over time as measures considered sufficiently
diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough
[in light of] new scientific or technological knowledge. It may
also change in relation to the risks involved in the activity . . .
less risky than exploration activities which, in turn, entail less
risk than exploitation . . . activities . . . may require different
standards of diligence. The standard of due diligence has to be
more severe for the riskier activities.131

Commentators observe that the principle of sovereign
equality has influenced to form the duty of due diligence. Balancing
different rights and interests among sovereign states is the essence
of the obligation of due diligence. 132 As many legal standards
128 . For the “prospective character” of the obligation under Article 194(1), see
Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb at 211.
129. Donald Anton, The Principle of Residual Liability in the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: The Advisory Opinion on Responsibility
and Liability for International Seabed Mining (ITLOS case no. 17), 7 MCGILL INT’L J.
SUSTAINABILITY L. AND POL’Y, 242, 243-4(2011).
130 . Alan Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious
Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction? 39
INT’L & COMP. L. Q., 1, 15 (1990).
131. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 43.
132. See Mathias Forteau, The Legal Nature and Content of ‘Due Regard’ Obligations
in Recent International Case Law, 34 INT’L J. OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 30 (2019); Julia
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require “some degree of care,” entailing setting a threshold that
must satisfy the extent to which a state’s behavior discharges such
an obligation,133 a due diligence obligation requires states to prove
that they have taken all the necessary measures domestically to
prevent environmental harm134 rather than guarantee a particular
result.
A question may arise regarding different parlance that seems
to indicate similar legal notions. In some cases, the terms, “due
regard,” “due diligence,” “reasonable regard,” 135 “due
recognition,”136 and “a reasonable standard of care”137 may bring
about subtle legal distinctions. 138 This Article, however, regards
these terms as functionally the same concept: a certain degree of
care. Many international courts and tribunals support this view. In
the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ regarded “reasonable
regard” as equivalent to “due regard.” 139 In the 2015 ITLOS
advisory opinion requested by the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission, ITLOS perceived “due regard” as the same as “due
diligence.”140 Also, the 2015 Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitral
tribunal viewed requirements of “good faith” and “due regard” as
equivalent.141 The 2016 South China Sea tribunal indicated that any
Gaunce, On the Interpretation of the General Duty of ‘Due Regard’, 32 OCEAN YEARBOOK 7
(2018).
133. Forteau, supra note 132, at 28.
134. VENTURA, supra note 48, at 212.
135. See, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, supra note 42, art. 2 (adopted on April 29,
1958) (“These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”).
136. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (UK v. Iceland), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 71.
137. ILC 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 154.
138. Some scholars presumably argue that due regard is stricter than due diligence
with the former being a relative obligation in comparison to due diligence not necessarily
being a relative obligation. See, e.g., Forteau, supra note 132, at 38.
139. Fisheries Jurisdiction,1974 I.C.J. at 29 (noting that “the principle of reasonable
regard . . . requires Iceland and [UK] to have due regard to each other’s interests, and to
the interests of other States . . . “).
140 . Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries
Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2015 ITLOS Rep., 61, 63 (stating that “The flag State is
under an obligation, in light of the provisions of article [58(3), 62(4), and 192] of
[UNCLOS], to take the necessary measures to ensure . . . The foregoing obligations are
obligations of ‘due diligence’”).
141. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 203, 211 (noting that “Article 2(3) requires the
[UK] to exercise good faith with respect to Mauritius’ rights . . . Article 56(2) requires the
[UK] to have due regard for Mauritius’ rights . . . The Tribunal considers these
requirements to be, for all intents and purposes, equivalent”).
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states’ behavior falling short of “due diligence” would fail to keep
“due regard” under UNCLOS.142 In short, it is reasonable to assume
that due regard and due diligence, among other such terms,
function in the same manner.
According to Article 3 of the ILC’s 2001 draft articles,143 “the
State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the
risk thereof.” Regarding due diligence, the ILC confirmed that the
conduct of the state of origin will determine the lawfulness of a
state's behavior in accordance with Article 3. 144 ILC further
commented that:
the State of origin is required . . . to exert its best possible
efforts to minimize the risk . . . States are under an obligation
to take unilateral measures to prevent significant
transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk
thereof arising out of activities . . . The standard of due
diligence . . . should be examined is that which is generally
considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree
of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance . . .
[Ultra-hazardous activities] require a much higher standard of
care in designing policies and a much higher degree of
vigour . . . its location . . . materials used in the activity, and
whether the conclusions drawn from the application of these
factors in a specific case are reasonable, are among the factors
to be considered in determining the due diligence requirement
in each instance.145

As emphasized above, the required degree of care is in
proportion to the degree of hazard involved. The potential degree
of harm that radioactive wastewater can cause is evident, although
142. South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 294 (stating that “the Tribunal considers that
anything less than due diligence by a State in preventing its nationals from unlawfully
fishing in the exclusive economic zone of another would fall short of the regard due
pursuant to Article 58(3) of the Convention”).
143. Article 2 of this draft instrument defines transboundary harm as “harm caused
in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than
the State of origin, whether or not the States concerned share a common border.” ILC 2001
Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 153. Also, in 2006, the ILC adopted eight draft principles
on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous
activities. Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth session A/61/10, pp.
106-110.
144. ILC 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 15.
145. Id.
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debated among scientists. Thus, Japan must know or should have
known that the discharge of wastewater has the risk of significant
harm. As the degree of harm is perceived higher, the required duty
of care should be greater.146
In practice, international jurisprudence has comported with
principles on due diligence put forward by ILC. For instance, in
2011, the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber has underlined that
“the standard of due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier
activities.”147 In the 2014 Virginia G case, ITLOS—viewing the term
“all possible consideration” as equivalent to “due regard”—stated
that the state functioning under UNCLOS should look over the
relevant situation thoroughly. 148 In addition, in the former
advisory opinion, ITLOS has approached the high standard of due
diligence as a “question of fact” rather than a “question of law”; the
riskier an activity, the more due diligence would be required.149
In some cases, international tribunals stress the need to
establish cooperative arrangements as a way of discharging a due
diligence obligation. In the 2012 Delimitation of the maritime
boundary in the Bay of Bengal case between Bangladesh and
Myanmar, ITLOS adduced a cooperative mechanism within the socalled “grey area,” in which one state’ continental shelf is
overlapped with the exclusive economic zone of other states.
Through the cooperative mechanism, due regard can be realized
by the “conclusion of specific agreements or the establishment of
appropriate cooperative arrangements” between coastal states.150

146. Id. at 155.
147. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 43.
148 . M/V “Virginia G” (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, 2014 ITLOS Rep., 99
(Apr. 14, 2014).
149. Makane Moïse Mbengue, The South China Sea Arbitration Innovations in Marine
Environmental Fact-Finding and Due Diligence Obligations, 110 AM. J. OF INT’L L. UNBOUND
285, 286 (2016). In this advisory opinion, UNCLOS perceived environmental impact
assessment, regulation and use of best available technology, application of the
precautionary principle, and availability of recourse for compensation for damage as the
contents of due diligence obligation. See Responsibilities and Obligations of States with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., ¶¶121-50.
150. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.),
Judgment, 2012 ITLOS Rep., ¶¶475–76.
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This cooperative format is further supported by the 2014 Bay of
Bengal Maritime Boundary arbitration.151
In 2015, the Chagos Marine Protected Area arbitral tribunal
denies the “one-size-fits-all” criterion for deciding the exercise of
“due regard.”152 The tribunal took a monumental step in adducing
six practical elements against which the question of due regard
should be examined. Specifically, the extent of the regard required
by UNCLOS will depend upon: a) the nature of the rights held by
other states (or the international community); b) the importance
of such rights; c) the extent of the anticipated impairment; d) the
nature and importance of the planned activities; e) the availability
of alternative approaches; and f) whether there was some
consultation with the affected State. 153 Paragraph 519 of the
Chagos Marine Protected Area award, in which these elements
were contained, was upheld by South China Sea.154 Furthermore,
the Chargos tribunal acknowledged the future rights of other states
need to be considered significant at the time of the judicial process
both as a matter of good faith and to satisfy UNCLOS. 155
International courts or tribunals will most likely examine the due
regard of any state activity that could potentially cause marine
degradation under the above criteria, bearing in mind the future
rights of other states and the rights at the time of litigation.
As many international lawyers agree, the 2016 South China
Sea arbitration espouses an expansive approach to due diligence in
the context of Part XII of UNCLOS, advancing practicality in testing
due diligence arising from the marine environmental protection
regime. 156 In this arbitration, the “normative sophistication or
diversification of international environmental law” is adopted as a
“source of richness for the standard of due diligence under general
international law.”157

151 . Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangl./India), PCA Case No.
2010-16, Award of 7 July 2014 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014) 103, ¶¶507–08.
152. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 202.
153. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 202.
154. South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 293.
155. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 203.
156. Mbengue, supra note 149, at 285-86.
157. Id. at 286 (further arguing that “International environmental law feeds the law
of the sea by giving a ‘particular shape’ to the duty of due diligence under Part XII of
UNCLOS”).

80

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1

So not only environmental treaties but also other regimes,
such as nuclear treaty regimes or fisheries regimes, can be
referenced in international proceedings that examine due
diligence associated with marine degradation down the road. In
brief, the South China Sea tribunal insists that a strong “level of
vigilance” is required under Part XII, deducing the “high standard
of due diligence” in the operation of a holistic-systemic treaty
interpretation. 158 In this sense, the tribunal shed light on the
“question of law” aspect of due diligence.159
Moreover, the tribunal validates that the due regard
obligation is an obligation of conduct 160 by advancing two
components: a) a duty to adopt rules and measures to prevent
harmful acts; and b) a duty to maintain a level of vigilance in
enforcing those rules and measures.161 Interestingly, the tribunal
decided that causing “environmental degradation” by the small
propeller vessels involved in harvesting the giant clams was illegal
within Part XII of UNCLOS. 162 Fukushima wastewater may be
viewed as causing “environmental degradation” because the scope
and scale of the planned release had more significant influence on
ocean degradation than a state’s fishery practice using “small
propeller vessels” in one part of the ocean.
As contemporary international jurisprudence shows, the
main characteristic of due diligence is its procedural nature, 163
alluding to procedural means in its application. In other words,
“the duty of due regard does not include real substantial
obligations [calling for] pragmatic, case-by-case measures to be
decided by the relevant states.”164 Therefore, a duty to cooperate is
deduced from due regard, which will be discussed below. Even
more importantly, a due diligence obligation is not only dedicated
to balancing the rights of different states, but also to heading off
breaches of UNCLOS—not least concerning areas beyond national
158. Id.
159. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 44-52.
160. South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 293-94 (quoting the 2015 ITLOS advisory
opinion).
161. Id. at 382.
162. Id. at 384.
163. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III,
supra note 53, at 431.
164. Forteau, supra note 132, at 32.
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jurisdiction, which look fundamental in terms of fulfilling the goal
of UNCLOS. 165 It is understood that Japan has a “procedural
obligation” to control and reduce the discharge of radioactive
wastewater from any source likely to pollute the marine
environment of areas beyond national jurisdiction or cause harm
to other states.166
Another consideration regarding due diligence is that states
should consult the precautionary principle in fulfilling this
somewhat elusive obligation. 167 Notwithstanding its status as a
principle rather than a customary law,168 the link between a due
diligence obligation and the precautionary approach is validated in
the ITLOS provisional measure of the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna
cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan)169 and in the 2010
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay. 170 Eventually, in 2011, ITLOS
announced in its advisory opinion that “the precautionary
approach . . . has initiated a trend towards making this approach

165. Id. at 42.
166. See Boyle, supra note 91, at 160.
167. The precautionary principle was initiated in international environmental law
and later this principle has started to permeate other fields of international law. See
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Precaution in International Law: Reflection on its
Composite Nature, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH 21 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.,
2007).
168 . Many scholars claim that the precautionary principle is a customary
international legal principle. See, e.g., James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Status of the
Precautionary Principle in International Law, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION 29-53 (David Freestone & Ellen
Hey eds,, 1996); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 279 (2d
ed., 2003). Meanwhile, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes argues that the reluctant attitude
of international judges in dealing with the precautionary principle demonstrates the
principle as not a principle of international law. Nevertheless, she assesses the principle is
soon likely to become a principle in customary law considering international, regional, and
domestic judicial trend. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 167, at 28-29.
169. Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Iapan), Provisional
Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 1999 ITLOS Rep., 296 (noting that parties “should in the
circumstances act with prudence and caution to ensure that conservation measures are
taken . . . there is scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the
stock of southern bluefin tuna . . . although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the
scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a
matter of urgency”).
170. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 71, ¶164 (stating that a “precautionary approach may
be relevant in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute” but
denying a “reversal of the burden of proof”).
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part of customary international law.” 171 The precautionary
principle has four constituting elements: a) risk, b) damage
(impact), c) scientific uncertainty, and d) capacities.172 Firstly, the
risk is a “more or less conceivable and contingent danger” that can
cause damage. As long as there is any trace of doubt as to the
occurrence of an event, there is a risk. Even “uncertain risks” that
have not been established by science but which are not
unthinkable must be handled by the precautionary principle. 173
“Scientific uncertainty” is a sine qua non condition to the
application and legitimacy of the precautionary principle.174 If the
risk is known, preventive measures can be exercised. If risk or
impact is unknown or contended—situations under “the absence
of complete scientific certainty due to the lack of adequate
scientific data”—a precautionary approach is essential to planning
activities. 175 Furthermore, in many conventions containing a
precautionary approach, the reversal of the burden of proof is a
necessary mechanism of implementation.176
As mentioned above, in the 2011 advisory opinion, ITLOS
emphasizes—while noting that the precautionary approach is
already an “integral part of the general obligation of due diligence”
of states’ activities in the Area—that:
[The due diligence obligation] applies in situations where
scientific evidence concerning the scope and potential
negative impact of the activity in question is insufficient but
where there are plausible indications of potential risks. A
sponsoring State would not meet its obligation of due diligence
if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard would amount to
a failure to comply with the precautionary approach.177

Although this advisory opinion was in relation to the Area, the
discussion is an important clarification of customary international
171. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 47.
172. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 167, at 22-23.
173. Id. (explaining that “not only a ‘risk ascertainable in a science laboratory,’ but
also a ‘risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for
adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die’”).
174. Id. at 24.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 26.
177. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 46.
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environmental law and Part XII of UNCLOS, with application to all
marine areas.
Although the precautionary principle has not expanded into
international jurisprudence, one certainty is that the constituting
elements of a precautionary principle, such as the “principle of
intergenerational equity” (the acknowledgment of the rights of
future generations) and the “principle of public participation” (the
request of scientific communities, the private sector, NGOs, and
local populations getting involved in decision-making processes)
are likely to be increasingly considered by international courts and
tribunals dealing with disputes regarding the marine
environment.178
D. The Obligation to Conduct Environmental Impact Assessments
An obligation of due diligence in preventing significant
transboundary harm requires states to ascertain whether there is
a risk of significant transboundary harm prior to undertaking an
activity likely to have an adverse impact on the environment of
another state or areas beyond national jurisdiction.179 A commonly
held view among international lawyers is that the duty to carry out
EIAs has become customary international law. 180 In 1969, US
domestic law established the first EIA obligation.181 Since the early
1990s, international lawyers have argued that conducting effective
EIAs before taking action that could adversely affect “either shared
natural resources, another country’s environment, or the Earth’s
commons” is a customary obligation in the making. 182 The Trail
Smelter decision also established an obligation to conduct an EIA
before state actions. This jurisprudential trend has continued ever
178. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 167, at 32-33.
179. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua
v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep., ¶153.
180 . See Kojima, supra note 53, at 175-6; Astrid Epiney, Environmental Impact
Assessment, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 587-88
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (indicating, however, that some scholars argue that
conducting EIAs is not yet part of customary international law). For a contrary view
regarding the legal status of EIA, see, for example, John H Knox, The Myth and Reality of
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L., 291, 319 (2002).
181. Epiney, Environmental Impact Assessment, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 176, at 581.
182 . See, e.g., Nicholas Robinson, International Trends in Environmental Impact
Assessment, 19 B.C. ENV. AFFAIRS L. REV. 602 (1992).
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since UNCLOS came into effect in 1994, despite the absence of an
explicit requirement of EIA in UNCLOS.183
Article 7 of the ILC’s 2001 draft articles sets forth that, “Any
decision in respect of the authorization of an activity within the
scope of the present articles shall, in particular, be based on an
assessment of the possible transboundary harm caused by that
activity, including any environmental impact assessment.”184 The
ILC commentaries mention that state practice converges to require
EIAs to “assess whether a particular activity has the potential of
causing significant transboundary harm” while acknowledging the
need of the states likely to be affected to get informed of and
evaluate what possible harmful effects that activity might have on
them. 185 Additionally, ILC confirms the importance of the
protection of the environment per se, not of harm to humans or
property.186
In the 1997 Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros case, ICJ acknowledged the
need for EIAs—without mentioning the term—by stating, “[t]he
awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the
recognition that environmental risks have to be assessed on a
continuous basis.”187 Later in the 2010 Pulp Mills case, ICJ affirmed
the obligation to conduct EIAs by noting, “[I]t may now be
considered a requirement under general international law to
undertake an [EIA] where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a
transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.”188 In
addition, in its 2011 advisory opinion, the ITLOS Seabed Disputes
Chamber stressed that “the obligation to conduct an [EIA] is a
direct obligation under [UNCLOS] and a general obligation under
customary international law” indicating that Article 206 of
183. This trend is often perceived as an example of the evolutionary interpretation
of UNCLOS. See Kojima, supra note 53, at 177.
184. ILC 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 157.
185. Id. at 159.
186. Id.
187. Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. ¶112
(Sept. 25). This ICJ position was criticized for not noting EIAs as a customary international
law principle. See generally Erika L. Preiss, The International Obligation to Conduct an
Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros
Project, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 307 (1999).
188. Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 83 (noting the need to have regard to the “nature and
magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment
as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment”).
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UNCLOS stipulates the EIA obligation on states.189 Interestingly, in
2015 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area
(Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica
along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), ICJ appears to
consider that states under less risks of significant transboundary
harm do not need to conduct EIAs. 190 However, as Yoshifumi
Tanaka observes, due to the difficulty of determining the subjective
appreciation in harm (“significant transboundary harm”), an
arbitrary decision of the state of origin not to conduct EIAs will not
likely be supported.191
Against this background, ITLOS, in the 2015 Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean case between Ghana
and Côte d’Ivoire, ordered provisional measures to carry out “strict
and continuous monitoring of all activities … with a view to
ensuring the prevention of serious harm to the marine
environment.192 Also, South China Sea innovatively affirmed, while
reiterating the obligation to carry out EIA as customary
international law,193 that:
Article 206 ensures that planned activities with potentially
damaging effects may be effectively controlled and that other
States are kept informed of their potential risks . . . While the
terms “reasonable” and “as far as practicable” contain an
element of discretion for the State concerned, the obligation to
communicate reports of the results of the assessments is
absolute.194

It appears that the difficulty of examining the propriety of
EIAs may have caused the tribunal to focus on the non-fulfillment

189. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 50, ¶145-46.
190. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua
v. Costa Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. at 720.
191. Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental Obligations Under the
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 121, at. 94.
192 . Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte
d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 2015 ITLOS Rep., 166,
¶ 108(1)(c).
193. South China Sea, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 377, ¶ 948 (citing the relevant paragraph
(145) of the 2011 ITLOS advisory opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States
with respect to Activities in the Area).
194. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 377, ¶948.
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of a procedural requirement: “communication.” 195 As will be
discussed, the duty to communicate the result of an EIA for a
planned activity to the affected states is included as part of carrying
out an EIA.
What is proper EIA? The quality of EIA is often disputed. In the
2001 Mox Plant case, the plaintiff state (Ireland) claimed that the
defendant state (United Kingdom) had failed to conduct a proper
assessment of the impact on the marine environment.196 It is true
that the specific contents of EIAs required in each case are left to
the discretion of each state.197 Nonetheless, as confirmed in South
China Sea, “comprehensiveness” of the contents of EIAs is a sine
qua non characteristic of EIA.198 Failing to exercise due diligence
“encompassing a full examination of the potential environmental
impact of a particular project” and due consideration for the
“interests of affected parties” may fall short of the EIA
comprehensiveness test. 199 Furthermore, if the likelihood of
affecting the marine environment of areas beyond national
jurisdiction by a planned activity is high, the “shared interests of
the international community, such as the long-term sustainability
of marine resources” should be taken into account at the scoping
stage of EIA.200
International doctrine, state practice, and legal obligations
among states all endorse a state duty to conduct transboundary
EIAs when engaging in activities likely to have environmental
consequences to other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The current trend on EIA seems to push Japan to conduct EIA and
monitor the environmental risks and impacts prior to the project
by carrying out periodic review.201 This is particularly so given that
195. Tanaka, supra note 121, at 96.
196. MOX Plant, 2001 ITLOS Rep. at 99, ¶26.
197. See Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 83, ¶205.
198. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 396, ¶990. See also Mbengue, supra note 149
at 287.
199. Warner, supra note 76, at 774.
200. Id.
201. The ICJ acknowledged in the Pulp Mills case that an EIA "must be conducted
prior to the implementation of the project. Moreover, once operations have started and,
where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its effects on
the environment shall be undertaken." Pulp Mills, 2010 I.C.J. at 83, ¶ 205. Given that the
release of radioactive wastewater into the ocean may have cumulative effects on human
health, conducting prior EIAs and monitoring of the environmental impact of any
discharge seems obligatory. In fact, most relevant treaties require states to make periodic
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marine environmental conditions change and scientific projection
develops over time.
E. The Duty to Consult as a Fundamental Principle under UNCLOS
and General International Law
The obligation to cooperate is explicitly embodied in Articles
123 and 197 of UNCLOS. As Alan Boyle stressed, a key principle in
both international environmental law and the law of the sea is the
duty to cooperate in the effort to control environmental risks.202
By nature, transboundary environmental effects of activities on
marine pollution are cumulative, distant, or uncertain, which
renders proving the damage and calculating compensation
unrealistic. In this respect, cooperation between coastal states, in
regarding conducting EIAs, consultation, and exchange of
information, is very much called for under UNCLOS.203 In principle,
the duty to consult neighboring states with regard to a future
project that might affect the rights and interest of such neighbors
ought to be exercised: a) within a reasonable time; b) in a spirit of
understanding of the other state’s concerns in connection of the
proposed activities; and if possible, c) by submitting suggestions of
compromise.204
The ILC’s 2001 draft articles provide some procedural
obligations for states to prevent transboundary damage to the
environment. These procedural obligations include “notification
of” and “consultation with” states likely to be affected prior to
authorization of activities based on a risk assessment.205 Under the
principle of good faith,206 the duty to consult should extend to “all
reports on matters affecting the treaty, although the extent of this obligation is varied. See
PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 36, at 242, 443, 461.
202. See Boyle, supra note 72 at 379.
203. See Stephen Stec & Gabriel E Eckstein, Of Solemn Oaths and Obligations: The
Environmental Impact of the ICJ’s Decision in the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project, 8 YEARBOOK INT’L ENVTL. L. 41, 48 (1997).
204. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III,
supra note 53, at 431.
205. Article 4 (Cooperation): States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as
necessary, seek the assistance of one or more competent international organizations in
preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk thereof.
See ILC 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 159–61.
206. Id. at 160 (noting that “The principle of good faith is an integral part of any
requirement of consultations and negotiations”). See also the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction
case, in which ICJ affirmed that “[t]he task [of the parties] will be to conduct their
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phases of planning and of implementation.” 207 Relevant to the
matter at issue, the notification shall be accompanied by available
scientific information on which the assessment is based.208
The duty to cooperate is a “fundamental principle in the
prevention of pollution of the marine environment” under UNCLOS
and general international law as confirmed in MOX Plant 209 and
South China Sea. 210 Since the duty to consult is inextricably
connected to due regard,211 a lack of consultation may amount to
failing to exercise due regard. Therefore, it is worth paying
attention to Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in
Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica).212 In
this case, ICJ opined—acknowledging that a risk of significant
transboundary harm can be revealed in the result of EIA—that the
state of origin is required to “notify and consult in good faith with
the potentially affected State, where that is necessary to determine
the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.”213
In South China Sea, the tribunal identified the duty to
communicate the results of EIAs as an absolute obligation,
regardless of different state capacities.214 Commentators parse the
meaning of “absolute” in a way that the duty to consult under
Article 206 is not limited to the risk that is thought as causing
negotiations on the basis that each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the legal
rights of the other.” See Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 78.
207. Article 4 (Cooperation): “States concerned shall cooperate in good faith and, as
necessary, seek the assistance of one or more competent international organizations in
preventing significant transboundary harm or at any event in minimizing the risk thereof.”
ILC 2001 Draft Articles, supra note 110, at 155.
208. Id.
209. MOX Plant, 2001 ITLOS Rep. at 99, ¶ 82.
210. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 377, ¶ 946.
211. See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening), 2014
I.C.J. Rep., 257, ¶ 83 (Dec.16) (noting that “the State parties to the ICRW have a duty to cooperate with the IWC and the scientific Committee and thus should give due regard to
recommendations calling for an assessment of the feasibility of non-lethal alternatives”).
212. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua
v. Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. Rep, at 665.
213 . Id., at 707, ¶104 (emphasizing that the duty to notify derives from a due
diligence obligation).
214 . South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at ¶948 (noting that “While the terms
‘reasonable’ and ‘as far as practicable’ contain an element of discretion for the State
concerned, the obligation to communicate reports of the results of the assessments is
absolute”).
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significant transboundary harm.215 Thus, there is ample room to
believe that the state of origin is under an obligation to
communicate the results of EIAs with (mostly) neighboring states
(or any other states likely to be affected) unless the state of origin
has a sound reason to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the activity planned would not cause any significant harm to the
marine environment. Although states of origin usually conduct
such assessments, countries likely to be affected may have a voice
in the decision-making process about the scientific “significance”
of the harm under the principles of good faith and due diligence.
In South China Sea, the tribunal considers that:
given the scale and impact of the island-building activities . . .
China could not reasonably have held any belief other than
that the construction “may cause significant and harmful
changes to the marine environment.” Accordingly, China was
required, “as far as practicable” to prepare an environmental
impact assessment. It was also under an obligation to
communicate the results of the assessment.216

Viewed in this light, Japan may decide that it would be
superfluous to conduct an initial or subsequent EIA around its
discharge of Fukushima wastewater into the sea, because the
associated transboundary harm would be insignificant. Even
though the duty of Japan to consult likely affected states would not
be invoked, Japan’s decision would likely still be declared illegal by
an international court or tribunal. As seen in South China Sea, the
decision not to conduct an EIA would be illegal based on the
assumption that the treated wastewater would bring about marine
degradation significantly, though incrementally.
Although it is unclear whether Japan has exercised the duty to
notify some of its neighbors of the results of an EIA regarding the
discharge of the wastewater through confidential diplomatic
channels, 217 it appears that, since Japan announced the release
plan, China, Russia, or Korea were not informed of such necessary
information, based on which of these countries should examine the
215. Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental Obligations Under the
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 121, at 94.
216. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at ¶ 988.
217. States are free to decide how they inform the states likely to be affected, but in
general, states contact the other states through diplomatic channels. See ILC 2001 Draft
Articles, supra note 110, at 160.
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possible effects of the planned discharge. The failure of notification
might be inconsistent with Japan’s obligations under UNCLOS,
general international law, and the Early Notification Convention.218
In some fields of international law, the duty to cooperate is an
evolving norm while functioning actively. 219 In international
environmental law, the duty to cooperate “is meant to serve as the
driving force for the progressive development” of multilateral
framework agreements whose effectiveness depends upon
continuing cooperation among the parties, developing “through
additional instruments such as protocols or measures.” 220 Some
provisions of UNCLOS are to be developed progressively as a
framework convention. As such, the duty to consult is the driving
force for the progressive development of Part XII of UNCLOS.221
F. The Marine Environmental Turn in the Law of the Sea and
Obligations Erga Omnes
The question remains whether massive marine
environmental pollutions, especially in areas beyond national
jurisdiction, could constitute a violation of an obligation erga
omnes. The phrase “obligations erga omnes” was first introduced
by ICJ in the 1970 Barcelona Traction case between Belgium and
Spain. In Barcelona Traction, ICJ put forward the concept of
“obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole,” which are “the concern of all States” and for whose
protection all states have a “legal interest.”222 These obligations are
comprehended as fundamentally different from those existing visà-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection. If
obligations under Part XII of UNCLOS were to take the “erga omnes”
nature, states with a “legal interest” might seek legal redress under
international law.
Jus cogens and obligations erga omnes have different legal
consequences. Nonetheless, these two notions are inextricably
interchangeable in the sense that “[a] rule from which no
218. See Takamura, supra note 3, at 106.
219. Kojima, supra note 53, at 178.
220 . Rüdiger Wolfrum, Cooperation, International Law of, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 789 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010).
221. Kojima, supra note 53, at 178.
222. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
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derogation is permitted because of its fundamental nature will
normally be one in whose performance all States seem to have a
legal interest.”223 Similarly, ILC confirms that “[p]eremptory norms
of general international law (jus cogens) give rise to obligations
owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga
omnes), in which all States have a legal interest.”224
Notably, Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of the Treaties affirms the notion of a “peremptory norm of general
international law” (jus cogens);225 yet, it leaves the establishment
of jus cogens in the hands of state practice and the jurisprudence of
international courts and tribunals. There is no single criterion for
identifying which rules of international law become peremptory
norms. Not surprisingly, the raison d’etre of obligations erga omnes
rests on the protection of fundamental values and the common
interests of the international community as a whole. 226 That is,
community interests reflecting the fundamental values of the
international community on a particular subject matter are a vital
element of identifying obligations erga onmes. 227 Arguably, this
would lead to the point at which obligations erga omnes may grow

223. Jochen A Frowein, Obligations erga omnes, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 916 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). Yoshifumi Tanaka explains the
difference between jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. See Yoshifumi Tanaka, The Legal
Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, 68 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 9-11
(2021) (exploring that “it may be said that obligations erga omnes horizontally expand the
scope of States that have legal interests in compliance, while the concept of jus cogens
vertically introduces a normative hierarchy in the international legal system . . . jus cogens
constitutes a subset of obligations erga omnes . . . the scope of obligations erga omnes is
wider than that of jus cogens, logically obligations erga omnes cannot be completely
identified on the basis of jus cogens . . . Jus cogens norms derive from the matrix of
obligations erga omnes, but not the reverse situation”).
224. Int’l Law Comm’n,, Rep. on the Work of its 71st session, U.N. Doc. A/74/10, at
145
(2015),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2019/english/chp5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29AX-EJNU].
225. “[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18.
226. See Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International
Law, supra note 223, at 29.
227. See Int’l Law Comm’n. Rep. on the Work of its 71st session, supra note 224. See
id. at 9; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 319 (2007).
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in scope over time to the extent to which all basic value of
international legal order would give rise to jus cogens.228
Many legal scholars observe that marine environmental
protection has gained the status of “common concern of
humankind” as marine degradation threatens the well-being of
persons living without centralized management regimes. 229 This
observation retains considerable purchase today despite the
failure of deeming the obligations to safeguard and preserve the
human environment as international crimes within the discussion
of ILC.230 In brief, the notion of international crime was expunged
from the Draft Articles Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts adopted by ILC in 2001; however, “common concern
of humankind” over the obligation to protect and preserve the
marine environment has survived in the form of obligations that
may be owed to the international community as a whole.231 The
resolution of third-party countermeasures (taken by not directly
injured states) against a serious breach by a state of an obligation
owed to the international community as a whole is claimed to have
been left to the “further development of international law.”232 Such
“further development of international law” has appeared in
international adjudication. For example, in the 2011 Seabed
Disputes Chamber advisory opinion, ITLOS opined that “[e]ach
State Party may also be entitled to claim compensation in light of
the erga omnes character of the obligations relating to preservation
of the environment of the high seas and in the Area.”233

228. See Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International
Law, supra note 223, at 2, 8; Jochen A Frowein, supra note 223.
229. VENTURA, supra note 48, at 193.
230. Article 19 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1980) clearly referred to “a
serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding
and preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution
of the atmosphere or of the seas” as an example of international crimes in violation of jus
cogens. See Frowein, supra note 228; Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on
the Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, [2000] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 70-71, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.1 (Part 2)/Rev.1.
231. Frowein, supra note 223, at 917.
232 . JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 305 (2002).
233. Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in the Area,
Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep., 59, ¶180. “Each state party” means erga omnes partes
under UNCLOS. Id.
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States’ obligations toward the international community
derive—relevant to the case of the marine environment—from the
“body of general international law” 234 and “international
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character,”235 such as
the UN Charter or UNCLOS. While obligations erga omnes do not
square with treaty obligations, 236 the source of obligations erga
omnes is germane to customary international law237 as elucidated
by ILC. 238 Therefore, obligations erga omnes are formulated
through the general process of customary law-making. 239
Following this logic, Yoshifumi Tanaka argues with conviction that
“the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment set
out in Article 192 of [UNCLOS] constitutes an obligation erga
omnes partes and an obligation erga omnes.”240
If any state breaches Article 192 and other provisions of
UNCLOS that have obligations erga omnes, “non-forcible
proportionate countermeasures” may be exercised by other states
against the state of origin “where no institutional system exists or
an existing system does not function properly.” 241 In addition, it
cannot be ruled out that international proceedings are established
as “non-forcible proportionate countermeasures” by a state
invoking obligations erga omnes regarding pollutions in areas
beyond national jurisdiction. An international court or tribunal
may be asked on such occasions to ascertain an erga omnes nature
234. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 ICJ Rep., 23 (stating that obligations erga omnes
derive from the “outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection
have entered into the body of general international law”).
235 . Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 32, ¶ 34.
236. Frowein, supra note 223, at 916.
237. Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law,
supra note 223, at 3.
238 . Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/74/10, at 159 (2019) (noting that “customary international law is the most obvious
manifestation of general international law”).
239. Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law,
supra note 223, at 11.
240. Id. at 7 (explaining that “[a] major difference between an obligation erga omnes
and an obligation erga omnes partes consists of a compromissory clause provided by a
treaty since the compromissory clause conferring jurisdiction on an international court or
tribunal applies only to the parties to a treaty”).
241. Frowein, supra note 223, at 918.
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of obligations under Article 192 of UNCLOS. Hypothetically, if the
majority of states unilaterally declare obligations under Part XII of
UNCLOS as obligations erga omnes, the confirmation process of
Part XII as obligations erga omnes will be accelerated, although
such unilateral declarations render the states to assume the
responsibility for keeping the obligations as erga omnes.242
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL
TURN IN UNCLOS FOR THE DISCHARGE OF FUKUSHIMA
WASTEWATER
Adopting appropriate rules and measures to prohibit marine
degradation is only one component of due diligence set out in
Articles 192 and 194. Taking proper steps to enforce those rules
and measures is another, or more important, indicator in deciding
whether states keep their obligations under Part XII. 243
Admittedly, in order for Japan to discharge its obligations under
Part XII in relation to the planned release of Fukushima
wastewater, obligations associated with “the corpus of
international law relating to the environment” and “other
applicable international law” must be taken into consideration.
And the international rules may include "new norms" and "new
standards" that have appeared after the activity begun.244
As South China Sea has shown,245 the Convention on Biological
Diversity will have some bearing on the release of Fukushima
wastewater because Japan is obliged to regulate, enforce, and
monitor measures toward the preservation of marine biodiversity
under Articles 5 to 8 of this Convention.246 This is particularly so
242 . Jan Kolasa, Unilateral Acts of a State in the Process of Forming Customary
International Law, 8 WROCLAW REV. L., ADMIN. & ECON., 59 (2018) (explaining that the
unilateral acts (including unilateral declarations) of states can be the basis of the creation
of customary international law).
243. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at ¶¶941-43, 964.
244 . Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (IJzeren Rijn) Railway between the
Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, decision of 24 May 2005,
VOLUME XXVII, pp.35-125, para. 59 (citing paragraph 140 of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
case).
245. The Tribunal stated that it has “no doubt that the harvesting of corals and giant
clams from the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal and features in the Spratly Islands
… has a harmful impact on the fragile marine environment. The Tribunal therefore
considers that a failure to take measures to prevent these practices would constitute a
breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.” Id. at ¶ 960.
246. See VENTURA, supra note 48, at 213.
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given that the “use of the terms ‘conserving’ and ‘managing’ in
[A]rticle 56 of [UNCLOS] indicates that the rights of coastal States
go beyond conservation in its strict sense.”247
In Northeast Asia, due diligence may pertain to fisheries
agreements between China, Japan, and Korea as “other applicable
international law” as far as protecting marine living resources from
treacherous pollutions is concerned. Article 11 of the Fisheries
Agreement between China and Japan (1997) indicates that the
China-Japan Fisheries Committee attends to the “circumstances
and conservation of marine living resources.”248 Also, according to
Article 12 of the Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement (1998), 249
subsidiary bodies composed of specialists may be established in
addition to the Korea-Japan Fisheries Committee. Logically, within
this bilateral fisheries regime, Korea may request of Japan that a
subsidiary body should be set up to discuss the effect of Fukushima
wastewater on marine living resources as a matter of the
“conservation and management of marine living resources in the
zone provided for in Article 9, paragraph 1” of this Agreement.250
In South China Sea, notwithstanding China’s repeated
assertions that it has conducted thorough environmental
assessments, the tribunal denied this claim on the ground that the
tribunal had not “identif[ied] any report that would resemble an
environmental impact assessment that meets the requirements of
Article 206 of the Convention.”251 Thus, it is necessary to examine
the propriety of the quality and quantity of the results of Japanese
EIAs on Fukushima wastewater, if any, against the
“comprehensiveness” test, which was underscored as the most
important characteristics of EIAs.252
As the planned discharge of Fukushima-treated wastewater
had potentially damaging effects, 253 China and Korea need to be
247. M/V “Virginia G”, 2014 ITLOS Rep. at 67, ¶ 212.
248. SUN PYO KIM, MARITIME DELIMITATION AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTH EAST
ASIA 342 (2004).
249. The preamble of this Agreement notes the “importance of rational conservation,
management and optimum utilisation of marine living resources.” Id. at 327.
250. Id. at 332-33.
251. South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 395-96, ¶989.
252. Mbengue, supra note 149, at 286-87.
253. Currie & Burnie, supra note 23 (describing that “For South Korea, the impacts of
this radiation exposure are of great importance to its fishing communities, the wider
population and the government. The toxic cocktail of radionuclides from Fukushima
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kept informed of the potential risks per Articles 204 to 206.254 Yet,
China and Korea do not seem to have been informed of the relevant
information. 255 As regional states likely to be affected by the
planned discharge, China and Korea should be consulted and
furnished with sufficient information, thereby enabling them to
assess the probable effects of the proposed release and provide
comments.256 The need for active communication between ChinaJapan and Korea-Japan per the potential impact of the planned
activity on marine living resources and marine biodiversity, let
alone seafood safety, in the Northeast Asian seas, is bolstered by
the fact that the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea (West Sea), and the
East Sea (Sea of Japan) are semi-closed seas in accordance with
Article 123 of UNCLOS.257
How much should Japan consult states likely to be affected by
the planned discharge of radioactive water? Chagos Protected Area
helps answer this question. Despite the UK’s claim that it had a
consultation with Mauritius, the tribunal found it difficult to
conclude that “this one meeting could satisfy the obligation to have
‘due regard’ or to consult.” 258 More to the point, the tribunal
Daiichi will rapidly disperse through the strong coastal currents along Japan’s Pacific coast,
and enter the East Sea via the East China Sea, including the waters of the Korean peninsula.
We know this as a result of sea water sampling following the March 2011 nuclear
disaster”).
254. Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental Obligations Under the
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 121, at 93.
255. See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on Japanese Government Decision
to Discharge Nuclear Wastewater from Fukushima Nuclear Plant into the Sea, MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFFS.
CHINA
(Apr.
13,
2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1868528.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3YUU-EAXN](“Despite doubts and opposition from home and abroad,
Japan has unilaterally decided to release the Fukushima nuclear wastewater into the sea
before exhausting all safe ways of disposal and without fully consulting with neighboring
countries and the international community.”); See also Boyd, supra note 17.
256. See Warner, supra note 76, at 774 (noting that “potential stakeholders could
include States, members of the public, international and regional organizations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, industry representatives, and
corporate entities”). See also Rules of Int’l L. Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, 1982
Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, 60 Int’l L. Ass’n
157, 171 (1982).
257. Donald Rothwell et al., Charting the Future for the Law of the Sea, in Donald
Rothwell et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), p. 901 (noting that “coastal geography is a main determinant in
shaping the area of application of cooperative mechanism…semi-enclosed seas…have been
a clear focal point for regional cooperation”).
258. Chagos MPA, Perm. Ct. Arb. at 208, ¶ 530.
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contrasted the United Kingdom’s approach to Mauritius with its
approach to consulting with the United States. The United
Kingdom presumed to conclude, without confirming with
Mauritius, that the MPA was in Mauritius interests, whereas the
United Kingdom consciously balanced “rights and interest,
suggestions of compromise and willingness to offer assurances by
the United Kingdom, and an understanding of the United States’
concerns in connection with the proposed activities.”259 Based on
this, the tribunal concluded that the United Kingdom failed to
exercise due regard vis-à-vis Mauritius. 260 Applying this
observation to the matter in question, Japan’s seemingly frequent
and close cooperation with the United States on the issue of
Fukushima wastewater is likely to work against Japan—as the
“absence of any justifiable rationale” for its haste261—in light of its
limited consultation, if any, with China or Korea.
UNCLOS has a compromissory clause. Notwithstanding some
limitations under Article 297 and optional exceptions under
Article 298, environmental matters—with the exception of certain
disputes on fisheries in the exclusive economic zones (Article
297(3)(a))—fall under the compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism. The matter surrounding the discharge of Fukushima
wastewater involves a dispute over the interpretation and
application of Part XII of UNCLOS. Although the constitution of
international litigation depends on the strength of the case, ITLOS
or an arbitral tribunal is not likely to “throw out good cases on
jurisdictional grounds if they can avoid doing so.”262 This trend has
been categorically revealed in South China Sea. Despite China’s
rejection of the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the grounds that the core
of the case lies in the territorial issue over maritime features263 and
that explicit consent of the parties is the prerequisite for
international arbitration, 264 the tribunal found that it had

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 210, ¶ 535.
Id.
Id. at 209, ¶ 533.
Boyle, supra note 91, at 164.
Chinese Soc’y Int’l L., The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study,
17 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 207, 254 (2018).
264. Letter from Ambassador Chen Xu of the People’s Republic of China in The Hague
Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Feb. 6, 2015).
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jurisdiction. Albeit with much criticism, 265 it is presumably
anticipated that international courts and tribunals will exercise
their power to find expansive jurisdiction down the road, not least
on the issues of the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, in
which a compromissory clause is to be invoked.266
If a provisional measure were requested in accordance with
UNCLOS with regard to Fukushima wastewater, ITLOS is likely to
prescribe in line with MOX Plant and Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean, a dispute between Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire which considered that the “risk of serious harm to the
marine environment is of great concern” to international courts
and tribunals, including ITLOS. 267 The ICJ uses the criterion of
“irreparable harm” in provisional measures proceedings, whereas
ITLOS chooses the criterion of a “risk of serious harm,” a criterion

265. China and some scholars criticize South China Sea for judicial activism. See, e.g.,
Chinese Soc’y Int’l L., supra note 263, at 541-42 (explaining that China and some scholars
criticize South China Sea for judicial activism); William G. Phalen, Interpretation of UNCLOS
Article 121 and Itu Aba (Taiping) in the South China Sea Arbitration Award, in
INTERNATIONAL MARINE ECONOMY: LAW AND POLICY 3, 5-6 (Myron H. Nordquist, et al. eds.,
2017) (assessing that “[t]he Tribunal was not empowered under the Convention to rewrite
the Convention text. It overstepped its role when it took upon itself to use the legitimate
procedural latitude entrusted to it to embark on a wide-ranging historical review of factors
with only a marginal relationship to the intended meaning of the Convention text and little
relation to the Conference negotiations . . . the Tribunal inaccurately concluded that none
of the features considered in the Spratly/ Nansha Group were ‘islands’. Such a conclusion
was procedurally convenient to allow the Tribunal to proceed with jurisdiction in the case
since under this holding there was asserted to be no overlapping sea boundaries between
the two parties to the arbitration”).
266. Nonetheless, many international lawyers fulminate against a phenomenon of
judicial activism in the case of international arbitration. See, e.g., Kirsten E. Boon,
International Arbitration in Highly Political Situations: the South China Sea Dispute and
International Law, 13 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 487, 490-92 (2014) (noting that
“[c]onsent is important because the states involved need to make a commitment to submit
themselves to a third party …. [A]rbitrators need to manage the consent of the parties. One
of the advantages of arbitration is that there is flexibility in the system, and parties have
more control than they would before national courts. However, parties can walk away
during the process, and even when parties agree to participate, they might reject an
award …. Without the consent and participation of one of the parties, the arbitration
process itself is unlikely to resolve the problem”).
267. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in
the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017,
Provisional Measures, 2015 ITLOS Rep., 33, ¶ 68. In South China Sea, the tribunal was
“particularly troubled” by certain environmental concerns while assessing the actual and
future harm. See South China Sea, Perm Ct. Arb. at 318, ¶ 957.

2021]

MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL TURN

99

which is lower than ICJ practice. 268 Japan’s lack of due diligence
may be found in its failure to monitor or assess the environmental
impact and consult neighboring states. The need to “act with
prudence and caution to prevent serious harm to the marine
environment” is likely to be also confirmed. 269 A hypothetical
provisional measure may prescribe; a) “exchange further
information” with regard to possible consequences for the
Northeast Asian Seas arising out of the planned discharge of
Fukushima wastewater; b) “monitor risks or the effects of the
operation” of the release of radioactive water for the Northeast
Asian Seas; and c) “devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent
pollution of the marine environment which might result from the
operation” of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.270
If the planned discharge causes a “risk of irreparable
prejudice” to the environment of areas beyond national
jurisdiction, it is possible that a dispute concerning breaches of
obligations erga omnes will be filed an international court or
tribunal.271 In such a case, no one can denigrate the possibility that
international courts or tribunals would “assume the role of a
guardian of the protection of a common interest reflected in
obligation erga omnes” and thereby entitle states that are not
directly injured to “seek the cessation and the assurance of nonrepetition of the wrongful act.”272
If international proceedings concerning Fukushima treated
wastewater were instigated, scientific evidence and expert reports
would be of great importance 273 because (legally binding)
268. Gautier, supra note 93, at 191 (noting that general obligations under Article 192
are “powerful tools to ensure compliance with environmental law. A state which claims
that such obligations have been violated may bring the dispute to an international court or
tribunal and request provisional measures to prevent damage to the environment”).
269. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Atlantic Ocean, 2015 ITLOS Rep.
at 35 ¶ 72.
270. See MOX Plant, 2001 ITLOS Rep. at 111.
271. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra
note 53, at 1285 (emphasizing that “any State will have standing to sue for breach or noncompliance. This also applies to the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment
of areas beyond national jurisdiction”).
272. Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law,
supra note 223, at 24-26. See also Frowein, supra note 223, at 918.
273. Tanaka, The South China Sea Arbitration: Environmental Obligations Under the
Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 121, at 95. The main lesson from Fukushima and
Chernobyl is that governments needs to work closely with scientists to plan ahead in case
disasters happen. See Wang, supra note 14, at 26.
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scientific standards are drafted by technical experts.274 The active
participation of scientific experts in the proceeding of South China
Sea is even viewed as having placed the de facto burden of proof
upon the experts. 275 Environmental disputes, let alone the
radioactive wastewater issue, have complex scientific and
technical aspects, making it necessary to have recourse to experts.
This inevitability is already provided for in Article 289 of UNCLOS
and Article 82 of the Rules of ITLOS, 276 which stipulates the
possibility to arrange for an expert opinion and to designate an
expert. 277 Hence, international proceedings dealing with the
marine environment are bound to use expert reports intensively.
However, environmental issues invariably raise competing
scientific claims. If two sharply differing views are presented in an
equally compelling manner,278 an international court or tribunal is
likely to act in a manner consistent with a precautionary approach.
Parenthetically, the resolution of the marine environmental
dispute may have recourse to the alternatives. First, although
Article 293(2) indicates that states can agree to apply “ex aequo et
bono” in judicial proceedings, this is unlikely. 279 Second, a
competent international body may seek an advisory opinion from
a judicial organ (ICJ or ITLOS).280 If the issue of marine degradation
caused by radioactive wastewater is reasoned within advisory
proceedings, such an opinion may serve to clarify the contents of
obligations (erga omnes) under Part XII concerning marine
environmental protection, including the protection of marine
274. Oxman, supra note 7, at 143-44.
275. Mbengue, supra note 149, at 287-89 (analyzing that South China Sea reveals that
“there is room for procedural law-making and innovation with respect to the use of
scientific experts in the system of international courts and tribunals”).
276. See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, art. 82, amended Mar. 25, 2021,
1833 U.N.T.S. 561.
277. Gautier, supra note 93, at 192.
278 . Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the
Progressive Development of International Environmental Law, in LAW OF THE SEA,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH
313, 315 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007).
279. Thus far, ICJ, let alone ITLOS, has never applied ex aequo et bono to any cases,
which indicates that no parties have agreed to choose this option. See THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT
OF
JUSTICE:
HANDBOOK
98
(7th
ed.,
2019),
https://www.icjcij.org/public/files/publications/handbook-of-the-court-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV45F989].
280. Advisory opinions are given to public international organizations. See id. at, 82;
See also International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, supra note 268, at art. 130-38,
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species and biological diversity. 281 In addition, in advisory
proceedings, the important role of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) seems to grow continuously despite the lack
of provisions on the status of NGOs before ICJ or ITLOS.282
The marine environmental turn in the law of the sea
engenders a cooperative movement in Northeast Asia. Under the
UNCLOS system, varying degrees of success have been achieved
with regard to the protection of the marine environment and
conservation of marine resources in many regions, often with the
support of the UNEP’s regional seas program and through regional
fisheries management organizations (RFMOs); however, the
Northeast Asian Seas are always exceptions. The Northeast Asian
Seas should be monitored and managed within a regional regime
not only because these seas are semi-enclosed,283 but also because
China, Japan, and Korea produce a great deal of land-based
pollutants, including nuclear power plant wastewater, causing
marine degradation of this region and beyond.284 Considering that
there is no exclusive economic zone boundary delimitation in these
seas, cooperative regime-building for multi-level cooperation is
needed.285 To this end, the voices of the “epistemic community”286
in the region must be heard in the decision-making process within
each government.

281. Tanaka, The Legal Consequences of Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law,
supra note 223, at 27-28.
282. Gautier, supra note 93, at 192-93 (explaining that NGOs’ written statements in
advisory proceedings are treated as “documents publicly available, and posted on the
website of the Tribunal”).
283. Semi-enclosed seas are suffering particularly badly from the effects of marine
pollution. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 334.
284 . See Pradeep A. Singh, International Organizations and the Protection of the
Marine Environment, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 54 (Marta Chantal et al.
eds., 2020) (noting that “a substantial extent of marine environmental harm is caused by
land-based sources, terrestrial and near coast environmental protection measures have a
large determining effect on the health of the oceans”). Article 195 provides that States shall
act so as not to transfer pollution from one area to another. Id.
285. See VENTURA, supra note 48, at 200 (explaining that ingle-sector decisions are
gradually being replaced by multi-level cooperation between pertinent agencies, with
participation of affected stakeholders).
286. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992). By definition, “[a]n epistemic community is a
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or
issue-area.”
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V. CONCLUSION
In the short term, radiation water does not greatly affect
humans. If exposed to radiation, radiation water may trigger
nausea and other flu-like symptoms. Yet, radioactive waste is not
biodegradable, nor is there any possibility of removing
radioactivity from the sea once it has entered the water. As a result,
seafood products become contaminated with radiocesium, and sea
vegetables become contaminated with radiostrontium, rendering
the seafood and sea vegetables containing these substances unsafe
for humans to consume. 287 This effect is particularly marked in
enclosed seas, such as the Northeast Asian seas.288
Thus far, states have made the most of the maxim, “the land
dominates the sea,”289 only to maximize their rights to maritime
zones. In the UNCLOS regime, states have claimed the importance
of land territory in order to gain more rights to EEZ and the
continental shelf without realizing the responsibilities attached to
this maxim. Seeing the marine environmental turn in the law of the
sea, sovereign states ought to realize that the “land dominates the
sea” principle comes with accompanying obligations; there is no
right without duty. Recovering both sides of the “land dominates
the sea” doctrine may require states to devote renewed attention
to their role as keepers of common by focusing on marine pollution
from the land-based source.290
Though the beginning of the “no harm principle” in general
international law was insignificant, the latter end would greatly
increase with the appearance of UNCLOS. As we have seen above,
state practice, the interpretation and application of UNCLOS by
international courts and tribunals, standards of international

287. Wang, supra note 14, at 25.
288. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 1, at 331. Meanwhile, Yukari Takamura argues
that “[t]he knowledge about a long-term radiological risk to the ecosystem is still very
limited in part because of scientific uncertainty.” See Takamura, supra note 3, at 93.
289. This maxim was approved by international courts and tribunals, for instance,
by Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 624, ¶ 140
(Nov. 19) (“The title of a State to the continental shelf and to the exclusive economic zone
is based on the principle that the land dominates the sea . . . the land is the legal source of
the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions to seaward.”).
290. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 109-10 (stating that land-based sources may have
detrimental effects not only on the oceans but on the global atmosphere and climate.
Consolidated efforts of restraining these sources are much needed).
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organizations,291 and the view of the epistemic community seem to
converge in enhancing the protection and conservation of marine
resources and the marine environment.292 This trend is likely to
continue to the extent to which obligations under Part XII are
declared “erga omnes” in international adjudication. Expanding
scientific knowledge about the marine environment and the
impact of pollutants, including radioactive wastewater, on that
environment will lend additional support to such confirmation.293
This Article reveals the potential for liability if Japan were to
discharge Fukushima wastewater without conducting EIAs and
notifying states likely to be affected by the planned release,
including China and Korea. If a lack of due diligence causes
significant harm to the marine environment, Japan will be liable for
failing to take all measures. States of origin should assume that in
future international proceedings for disputes over marine
degradation, particularly affecting areas beyond national
jurisdiction, they will be requested to apply a high and strict
threshold to their land-based activities affecting the health of the
marine environment.

291. International Maritime Organization’s official interpretation regards “pipelines”
as “other man-made structure at sea” within the meaning of the “dumping” definition. See
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
art. 3, Dec. 29, 1972, 36 I.L.M 1. If this definition is accepted, the scope of the definition for
“dumping” would be vastly extended so that man-made structures that have direct access
to the sea such as channels would also be included. See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY, PART III, supra note 53, at 1384.
292. Tullio Treves, Historical Development of the Law of the Sea, in Donald Rothwell
et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), p. 2 (noting that state practice, international courts and tribunal, and writings of
international lawyers contribute to the development of international law); see BIRNIE ET
AL., supra note 36, at 388 (stating that later developments in general international law have
reflected the interpretation and application of UNCLOS).
293. See Oxman, supra note 7, at 113.
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